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**NATO BUREAUCRATIC & INFRASTRUCTURE
TRANSFORMATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY**

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NATO BUREAUCRATIC & INFRASTRUCTURE TRANSFORMATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The NATO bureaucratic and military infrastructure was designed to provide for European (and North Atlantic) stability through collective defense, against the back drop of a Soviet Union military that was not standing down in size following World War II¹. In fact, during the late 1940's the Soviet Union was showing clear and dramatic expansionist tendencies in the region. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the *raison d'être* for the North Atlantic Alliance has vanished. To survive politically (and thus economically) for the long term in the 21st Century, NATO must significantly and realistically change its mission and structure to include reductions in the Brussels bureaucracy and elimination of the system of permanent, regional military commands known as the Integrated Command Structure. The future NATO peacetime focus should be primarily on developing and exercising standardized command and control systems and procedures and less on combat systems hardware commonality and supportability. NATO should shift away from standing military command structures and instead move positively towards the mission and participant specific CJTF concept. To accomplish these reductions, NATO must review the 1949 Washington Treaty and get back to the basic business of collective defense instead of searching for new, post Cold-War, peacekeeping, humanitarian, and out-of-area missions not related to Articles 4 and 5.

¹ NATO Office of Information and Press NATO Handbook Brussels October 1995 p. 20

of the Treaty. Finally the future NATO must continue to reach out to its Eastern, non-NATO members in programs such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Partnership for Peace (PFP).

Unfortunately, NATO and its member's national defense bureaucracies are typically self-justifying and self-sustaining and often give only lip service to the real infrastructure reductions required to adjust to the reduced collective security challenges in the upcoming decade.

BACKGROUND

Clearly the United States has enduring interests in Europe, not only political, security and economics related interests, but also, and just as importantly, socially and culturally related interests. We have strong political and economic ties to the region which certainly justify continuation of the NATO collective defense alliance. NATO's success has also been in building strong relationships between member nations, thus further reducing the possibility of armed conflict between them. In July 1997, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana said "NATO is not only a military alliance, but it is also, and more importantly, a moral alliance."²

The case for enlargement of NATO to include Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic is equally convincing and sound, so long as the Alliance continues close and aggressive confidence building measures with Russia and CIS countries throughout the

² Solana, Javier, Remarks at American University, Washington DC, 24 July 1997. U.S. Dept of Defense Defense Issues, Vol 12, Nr 39. <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/di97/di1239.html>

process. Reassuring Russia is particularly important as the perceived line of demarcation between East and West moves easterly and encroaches on previous Warsaw Pact territory.

Membership in NATO will also act as a stepping stone for new members to integrate with the European community and to move towards their critical economic and social membership in the European Union. The hurdle for NATO member nation approval of enlargement appears to be the projected “common-funded” costs to bring the prospective member nations into the alliance.

NATO’s Senior Resource Board (SRB) estimates these costs to NATO member nations to be approximately \$1.5 billion. The vast majority of these costs are allocated to immediately expand NATO’s integrated air defense system (40%) and to upgrade air, land and maritime force reception facilities (48%). The remaining 12% would go towards command and control networks and training and exercises.³ Nearly 90% of the common-shared costs of NATO expansion are in support of infrastructure expansion in the new member nations who clearly benefit more from these upgrades in the short term, than the Alliance would. Under current proposals, the United States will fund approximately one fourth of these common-shared costs, which would in turn be spread across ten fiscal years.⁴

³ U.S. Department of Defense Report to the Congress on the Military Requirements and Cost of NATO Enlargement, February 1998, Defense Link <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/nato/index.html>

⁴ Ibid.

ENDURING REASONS FOR NATO

Although the clear threat of the Soviet Bloc and the Warsaw Pact is gone, NATO clearly has valid strategic and operational reasons for its continued existence

Strategically, the Alliance allows for a continued strong American influence in European affairs both politically and economically. A stratified, unstable Europe or one in active conflict is clearly not in the national interest of the United States.

Operationally, our membership in the Alliance brings significant advantages to U.S. military operations in Europe and around the world. Basing access and logistics support in the region, which are facilitated by NATO and NATO support agreements, are critical towards our forward deployed operations in Europe, the Mediterranean and in the Middle East. The Alliance also allows for unmatched intelligence sharing and access and gives our intelligence structure forward based windows into the Commonwealth of Independent States and Middle Eastern countries. Common command and control systems and cooperative regional air defense complement U.S. unilateral operations in the area. Finally, close ties have developed at the military level, facilitating excellent working relations in non-NATO military coalition activities outside of the European region.

REDUCTION OF THE BRUSSELS INFRASTRUCTURE

NATO has justifiably become a two faceted alliance with both a political mission (embedded in the North Atlantic Council (NAC)) and a military mission (embedded in

the Military Committee) Both of these facets are important but in some cases they have become redundant with parallel organizations such as the Organization for Security & Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Western European Union (WEU), European Union (EU) European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), EUROCORPS, EUROFOR, EUROMARFOR, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the CJTF ^{5 6} While these examples are not all inclusive, they are a representation of current and proposed diplomatic and military structures in Europe

At NATO headquarters in Brussels there are nearly 4000 persons employed to support the Alliance ⁷ On the civil side, along with the traditional bureaucratic staff and directorates there are twenty-five committees addressing topics from infrastructure, to national armaments to economics to proliferation There are also the typical logistics and support agencies, similar in range but smaller in size to those found in the U S Department of Defense

Does NATO continue to need this large headquarters civilian infrastructure? NO This structure was laid out at the onset of NATO and has adapted and expanded over the years in response to the Warsaw Pact threat That threat has reduced, the primary mission of collective defense has eased and the staff size must be reduced accordingly Large bureaucracies do not serve combat readiness and can no longer be afforded by the member nations While this clearly will be a political issue, particularly in Brussels, NATO must bite the bullet and trim back, by streamlining and working smarter, not harder

⁵ Barry Charles L, Creating a European Security and Defense Identity Joint Force Quarterly NDU Press, Ft McNair, Spring 1997, Nr 15, p 62

⁶ Messervy-Whiting Graham WEU Operational Development Joint Force Quarterly, NDU Press Ft McNair, Spring 1997 Nr 15, p 70

Specific areas requiring less emphasis include

- < Development of common weapons systems
- < Common nuclear weapons planning
- < Common aircraft development
- < Scientific and environmental affairs

Particular areas that serve a vital military function and should not be reduced include

- < Common command and control system development
- < Standardization of basic, common tactical procedures (not equipment related)
- < Standardization of basic supportability requirements (fuels, combat logistics)
- < Military strategic and operational planning to include CJTF operations
- < Centralized operational command infrastructure
- < Intelligence collection activities

INTEGRATED COMMAND STRUCTURE REDUCTIONS

The Integrated Command Structure of NATO consists of the Military Committee in Brussels and two Major NATO Commanders (MNC's), SACEUR near Mons, Belgium at SHAPE Headquarters and SACLANT in Norfolk, Virginia. Beneath each of the

⁷ NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook Brussels October 1995 p 137

MNC's, there are a host of subordinate commands further broken down by air, land and sea components. There are also standing reaction forces in the maritime and land environments as well as the NATO Airborne Early Warning (NAEW) forces and the ground based air defense network. Each of the commanders and subordinate commanders is headed by a NATO member country general or flag officer who is typically dual-hatted with a national command mission. Generally, the United States holds the key positions throughout the structure, often a trouble spot with some of the larger and more influential NATO allies.

This advanced military command structure was designed and implemented during the Cold War and has little applicability now, although in a quest for new missions and continued existence, some have found new jobs to sustain their position and relevance. This structure needs to be significantly reduced and perhaps eliminated in its entirety with a smaller, more streamlined structure replacing it.

In the place of the current structure, a central military command for operations should be established at the SHAPE Headquarters in Belgium. This command would replace SACLANT and SACEUR as well as the subordinate commanders. It would have operational control of NATO air defense systems and standing land and maritime rapid reaction forces and would be the command and/or marshalling center for mission/country specific CJTF operations inside or outside of the European theater. Standing NATO forces would be limited to those units established now, as well as the land and air based air defense network. With the exception of the command staffs, the NATO staffs, and the standing forces, member countries would no longer earmark actual or contingency forces.

to NATO. Instead, the CJTF concept would be exercised to provide mission specific, tailored force packages when required.

CJTF CONCEPT

The CJTF concept, a result of the 1994 Brussels NATO Summit, allows for tailored forces from a consortium of member countries to operate under NATO or other auspices to achieve limited operations or peacekeeping operations in support of NATO member country security interests.⁸ Under the CJTF, the WEU, for example, could lead a non-NATO Bosnia peacekeeping operation using the NATO infrastructure and with United States support in specific areas where required (C-4I, surveillance, etc.). When the CJTF concept was approved at the Summit of 1994, it was envisioned for exactly this type of mission and in support of fostering the European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI).⁹

The CJTF concept is optimal for a transformed NATO for several reasons. First, it allows countries and organizations other than the U.S. and NATO to lead specific operations-other-than-war where only a coalition of some NATO countries may have a clear national interest at stake. Use of NATO command and intelligence assets for such an operation would be approved by NATO but not necessarily controlled and directed by NATO. Second, as NATO expands eastward, more member countries will make obtaining a consensus on a specific NATO military or peacekeeping action increasingly

⁸ Cragg Anthony, "The Combined Joint Task Force concept: a key component to the Alliance's adaptation," NATO Review Web Edition No. 4, Vol. 44, pp. 7-10
<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/9604-2.htm> July 1996

⁹ Barry, Charles L. "Creating a European Security and Defense Identity," Joint Force Quarterly, NDU Press, Ft. McNair, Spring 1997, Nr. 15, p. 62.

difficult. Through the CJTF concept, a group of interested nations could act separately, using NATO assets, but not necessarily with the unanimous political advice and consent of all the member countries. Finally, the CJTF concept allows NATO forces to be used in non collective-defense functions by a coalition, which may or may not consist of all NATO members, but may also have non-NATO participants. Dr John Hillen of the Heritage Foundation describes such actions of these de-facto alliances as “Coalitions of the Willing”¹⁰

In the event of a collective defense requirement under Article 5 (direct threat to a member country), a mission specific CJTF would again be formed to deal with the crisis, including all NATO countries as well as any outside coalition countries that could be mustered. The CJTF would be commanded from the SHAPE headquarters. The existing NATO rapid reaction forces would respond until full strength could be built up by the NATO coalition. This build up would be along the lines of the Desert Storm Coalition model.

Certainly, if the security situation in Europe changes for worse, short of an attack on a member nation, rapid reaction forces could be enhanced gradually, based on threat intelligence, under control of the central military command at SHAPE. But clearly, under the current security conditions, it is unlikely that Russia or any other European or Asian state would directly attack a NATO member in Europe. This allows NATO to assume the risk of eliminating the current command structure and moving towards a more streamlined, peacetime military operation.

¹⁰ Hillen, John. Planning a Coherent Military Strategy, http://www.pft.org/heritage/mandate/ch_5

CHANGES IN ROLES & MISSIONS; GETTING BACK TO BASICS

As NATO transforms itself for the 21st Century, we need to look hard at roles and missions and get back to the basics. Article 5 of the NATO Treaty states that the armed attack against one country will be considered as an armed attack against all the countries and will be responded to by all countries in exercise of individual or collective self-defense as discussed in the U N Charter. Article 4 of the Treaty directs *consultation* when the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened ¹¹

There is nothing in the charter about responding to peacekeeping or humanitarian operations within or outside of the North Atlantic theater. Accordingly, such actions should not occur under NATO auspices, but instead under the CJTF concept with possible use of NATO assets but *not* under NATO operational control. Using NATO led forces in a peacekeeping role will likely not gain long term support from the U S public nor from the Congress. Member countries have invested a great deal of financial resources and political capital in building this massive defense infrastructure and using these forces and structure for war is quite appropriate. NATO, as the leader of a peacekeeping or humanitarian force is not appropriate. NATO should not become a Westernized version of the United Nations.

TRANSFORMATION

To survive in the long term, NATO must change to be more efficient and less expensive to the member nations, while not degrading the most successful military

¹¹ NATO Office of Information and Press NATO Handbook Brussels, October 1995 p 231

alliance in history As we prepare for the 21st Century, the Alliance should focus its transformation efforts in the following areas

- Reduce the Brussels civilian infrastructure by 40%, focusing remaining assets on command, control, intelligence, military operational planning and most importantly logistical and basic tactical standardization Reduce the emphasis on common war-fighting hardware
- Eliminate the existing military command structure and replace it with a central operational command located at SHAPE headquarters Refrain from creating new roles and missions for the Alliance Restrict NATO-led military operations to Article 5 collective self-defense situations
- Move positively towards the mission and participant specific CJTF concept Allow use of NATO assets for NATO member led multi-lateral or unilateral operations on a case-by-case basis
- Continue NATO expansion, but expand new member, common-shared, infrastructure cautiously and at a moderate, vice accelerated pace

NATO is not cost free but for the money we spend to support it is a great deal It makes sense to keep our ties to Europe strong and to avoid a European conflict on the scale of the Great World Wars Through adaptation and firm resolve towards streamlining and efficiency, the Alliance can survive well into the next century